The Financial Services Tribunal has no jurisdiction to reconsider a regulator’s intervention at the instance of a disappointed trustee

Authored by Michelle David and Ntokozo Ngubane.

In a Financial Services Tribunal (the Tribunal) decision handed down on 18 June 2026 in the matter of Lindelani Sigidane v Financial Sector Conduct Authority (Case No A15/2026), the Tribunal confirmed that a trustee who lost his seat when the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (the regulator) stepped in to appoint an interim board in terms of section 26(2) of the Pension Funds Act, 1956 (PFA) is not a “person aggrieved”, and as such cannot have the regulator’s decision reconsidered.

The main issue under reconsideration was whether such a trustee, who was merely disappointed by the regulator’s decision, had the standing required to challenge the decision of the regulator at all, when regard is had to the jurisdictional pre-requisites of the Tribunal under section 230(1)(a) read with section 218, of the Financial Sector Regulation Act, 2017 (FSR Act). 

In this matter the dispute arose out of a governance crisis at the PRASA Provident Fund (Fund):

1. In terms of the rules of the Fund, its board of trustees (Board) was made up of 14 trustees, comprising of seven employer appointed trustees and seven member elected trustees.  The Fund’s quorum required seven board members to be present at meetings and that is comprised of four elected member trustees and three employer appointed trustees.
2. That balance collapsed during 2025 when three “elected” trustees were found to have been deployed by unions rather than properly elected by members, was required by the Fund rules and consequently led to their removal from the Board.  In addition, a fourth elected trustee was placed on precautionary suspension by the employer.  As such, the board could no longer form a quorum and was, as the Tribunal put it, improperly constituted, dysfunctional and inoperative.
3. Faced with this paralysis, the chairperson of the Fund asked the regulator to intervene.  The regulator engaged with the Fund and asked it to nominate two trustees from its erstwhile board for its consideration. The Fund did so, and on 4 November 2025 the regulator appointed those two nominees, alongside two independent members, as an interim board, assigning them duties under section 26(2)(b) of the PFA.
4. Lindelani Sigidane (Mr Sigidane), who had served on the dysfunctional board as an elected trustee, was not among the nominees. In February 2026 he wrote to the regulator seeking the reasons for the appointment of those who were handpicked by the regulator, relying on the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (PAJA), and argued that the appointment was administrative action that adversely affected his rights.
5. In March 2026 he applied to the Tribunal for reconsideration, contending among other things that the regulator had failed to give the Fund 90 days’ written notice before appointing the interim board, as he alleged was required under section 26(2) of the PFA.
6. The regulator opposed the application, amongst others, on the basis that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the same in that under section 230 of the FSR Act, only a “person aggrieved” by a “decision”, as defined in section 218 of the FSR Act, may seek reconsideration.  

7. On this aspect, the Tribunal held that;

   a. jurisdiction is determined by the complaint itself and the allegations in it, not by the merits of the complaint which is a trite principle confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (1) BCLR 35 (CC), 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC).

   b. Having considered the above, the Tribunal held that, on the facts, the regulator’s decision was directed at the Fund, not at Mr Sigidane. The decision did not remove him from office, and it made no finding about his fitness, propriety or conduct.   Drawing on Impala Platinum Limited v Registrar of Pension Funds, in which the Tribunal’s predecessor held that appointing an interim board does not “remove” the existing trustees, the Tribunal held that Mr Sigidane had not lost his membership through the regulator’s decision.  He had, in any event, conceded at the hearing both that the regulator had acted lawfully and that the Fund did not object to the intervention.

   c. What remained, therefore, was merely Mr Sigidane’s disappointment at not having been chosen by the regulator. With reference to Francis George Hill Family Trust v South African Reserve Bank (Case No. A5/2017), the Tribunal recalled the long-standing caution that a “person aggrieved” is not someone denied a benefit he had hoped for, but someone against whom a decision has been pronounced that wrongly deprives him of something.

Mr Sigidane was, the Tribunal said, “a classic disappointed applicant who is no worse off in law, and therefore not aggrieved.  His application was accordingly dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The outcome in this matter confirms that boards must always seek to ensure that they conduct themselves in a manner that does not give rise to a section 26 board. Where a section 26 board is appointed in accordance with the PFA, all trustees in place immediately before such appointment are vulnerable to being not chosen to participate in such board regardless of whether they were appointed or elected to the board.  Being aggrieved by the decision of the regulator is not sufficient for purposes of a successful challenge in circumstances where there has been no finding in respect of the particular trustees. 

Lindelani Sigidane v Financial Sector Conduct Authority (Case No A15/2026 - 18 June 2026).